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Abstract 
In general terms, e-government can be defined as the use of information and 
communication technologies in government settings. However, it is neither a 
homogeneous nor a static phenomenon. In recent years, empirical studies have 
identified two interesting dynamics in e-government evolution. First, e-government 
has evolved from its initial presence on the Internet to a more transactional and 
integrated approach. Second, at the aggregate level and as a general trend, national 
governments have started adding technological sophistication and have been followed 
by state and local governments. This paper attempts to explain these two dynamics in 
the evolution of e-government as a result of pressures from the administrative 
apparatus of government and from the expectations of stakeholders involved in the 
policy process such as citizens, politicians, and businesses. Both forces promote 
change in the system of rules governing the design, implementation, and use of e-
government initiatives. Some policy implications are provided at the end of the paper. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Governments are increasingly using information and communication technologies in their daily 
business. As a consequence, the study of e-government has increased in recent years and several 
theoretical approaches to understand e-government and conduct digital government research 
have been developed (Gil-García and Luna-Reyes 2003; Schelin 2003). One of these approaches 
to e-government understanding describes the evolution of e-government initiatives in terms of 
their degree of technological and organizational sophistication (Moon 2002; Gil-García and 
Luna-Reyes 2003; Schelin 2003). Within this evolutionary approach, several studies have been 
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developed, but their scope is mainly descriptive. In order to explain how and why this evolution 
has taken place, more analytical research and sound theoretical frameworks are needed. This 
paper proposes a theory of e-government evolution as a result of important dynamics found in 
the way in which systems of rules interact with action in organizational settings. This theoretical 
framework poses a link between how public managers decide on e-government initiatives and 
how citizens and other stakeholders involved in the policy process internalize those decisions 
and subsequently influence them over time. 
 In the context of e-government evolution, we use institutional theory and the study of 
rules as sources of change (Feldman 2000) to reframe the well-established politics-and-
administration dilemma (Wilson 1887). Our theory explains that, at the aggregate level, e-
government has been adding more technological and organizational sophistication as a result of 
both institutional isomorphism and pressures from citizens, politicians, businesses, interest 
groups, and other stakeholders. In addition, e-government initiatives are evolving from the 
national to the local level. If local governments are more sensitive to citizens’ needs as 
devolution scholars argue, the situation described above may imply a change from self-imposed 
initiatives searching for solutions (administration-performance), to externally imposed 
requirements by citizens, their representatives, and other stakeholders (politics-accountability). 
This paper is organized in seven sections including these introductory comments. Section 
two describes two dynamics of e-government evolution. First, there is a constant addition of 
technological sophistication, interaction capabilities, and business rules. This dynamic has been 
framed as e-government stages from presence to transaction to integration. Second, the evolution 
according to these stages has not been equal at all levels of government. In fact, there seems to 
be a trend from the national level to state and local governments. Section three introduces basic 
concepts about the study of rules and rule evolution. In section four, it is shown how systems of 
rules can be designed mainly to address problems (performance) or to exercise control 
(accountability). These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive and all rule systems represent 
certain degree of both solution-guiding and behavior-constraining dimensions. 
Section five integrates the bi-dimensional framework to systems of rules with some of the 
complexities of government settings. Specifically, this section addresses the issue of multiple 
stakeholders, and therefore, multiple designers of rule systems in the public sector. It also 
provides some examples of how this work for e-government initiatives. In section six, the old 
politics and administration dilemma is revisited and framed in terms of performance, 
accountability, and the bi-dimensional framework to systems of rules. This framing is 
exemplified by analyzing the second dynamic of e-government evolution and hypothesizing 
some potential implications. Finally, section seven discusses other practical implications of the 
theoretical model and suggests avenues for future research. 
 
II. E-Government Evolution 
In order to understand how systems of rules affect the evolution of e-government, it is necessary 
first to comprehend the way in which scholars have characterized e-government evolution (Hiller 
and Bélanger 2001; Layne and Lee 2001; UN and ASPA 2002). The evolutionary approach 
examines e-government stages: from developing a web page to integrating government systems 
behind the web interface. In this view, governments evolve from one stage to the other (Schelin 
2003). Each of the stages represent different levels of technological sophistication, citizen 
orientation, and administrative change (Moon 2002; Holden, Norris and Fletcher 2003). In 
addition, some empirical studies have identified a dynamic progression in e-government 
sophistication from national to state to local governments (Stowers 1999; Moon 2002; Edmiston 
2003). Following, we briefly describe these two e-government dynamics. 
 
E-Government Stages 
This section presents a summary of different stage-models to e-government evolution (Hiller and 
Bélanger 2001; Layne and Lee 2001; UN and ASPA 2002). It is important to clarify that in 
reality these stages are not necessarily mutually exclusive or progressive (Moon 2002; Sandoval 
and Gil-García 2005). In fact, specific e-governments initiatives may include characteristics 
identified with several of the following stages. Therefore, this paper does not argue that the 
stages are necessarily right, but recognizes that at the aggregate level technological 
sophistication has been continuously added. 
 Initial Presence.  This happens when a country, state, or local government has a formal 
presence on the Internet through a limited number of individual governmental pages (mostly 
developed by single governmental agencies). Governments in this stage normally offer static 
information about agencies and some of the services they provide to citizens and private 
organizations. 
 Extended Presence.  In this stage, governments provide more dynamic, specialized 
information that is distributed and regularly updated in a great number of government sites. 
Sometimes a national government’s official site serves as an entry point with links to pages of 
other branches of government, ministries, secretariats, departments, and subnational 
administrative bodies. Some governments might start using electronic mail or search engines to 
interact with citizens, businesses and other stakeholders. 
 Interactive Presence.  Governments use a statewide or national portal as the initial page 
providing access to services in multiple agencies. The interaction between citizens and different 
government agencies increases in this stage (e.g., e-mail, forums, etc.). Citizens and businesses 
can access information according to their different interests. In some cases, passwords are used 
to access more customized and secure services. 
 Transactional Presence.  Citizens and businesses can personalize or customize a national 
or statewide portal. This portal becomes a unique showcase of all the governmental services 
available in the relevant area of interest. The needs of different constituencies are the main 
criteria for portal design and access (government structure and functions are only secondary 
criteria). The portal allows secure electronic payments to be made, facilitating transactions such 
as tax, fines, and services payments. 
 Vertical Integration.  This stage encompasses the integration of similar services provided 
by different levels of government. This integration can be virtual, physical, or both. Therefore, 
this stage does not refer solely to an incipient integration in the form of government websites, but 
to the change and reconstruction of the processes and/or governmental structures. 
 Horizontal Integration.  Layne and Lee (2001) argue that horizontal integration between 
different governmental services must exist for citizens and other stakeholders to have access to 
all the potential of information technologies in government. Therefore, in this stage governments 
need to cross organizational boundaries and develop a comprehensive and integral vision of the 
government as a whole. Vertical and horizontal integration do not necessarily happen together or 
sequentially. 
 Totally Integrated Presence.  This stage refers to the situation in which government 
services are fully integrated (vertically and horizontally). Citizens have access to a variety of 
services through a single portal, using a unique ID and password. All services can be accessed 
from the same web page and can be paid in a consolidated bill. A transformation unseen by the 
public has taken place, and now services are organized according to processes and 
constituencies, not only virtually, but also physically. In this stage, governments undertake 
institutional and administrative reforms that fully employ the potential of information 
technologies (Grönlund 2001). 
 
From National to Local E-Government 
The descriptions above show how each of the stages represent the addition of several rules and 
standards relating to what e-government activities are expected to be in a governmental 
community. The stages are presented as the correct path to follow in order to develop a fully 
integrated e-government initiative (Layne and Lee 2001). However, it is important to emphasize 
that these stages vary among national contexts and levels of government. In fact, there seem to 
be clear differences between national, state, and local governments. 
 Figure 1 shows hypothetical trends in e-government sophistication adoption at different 
levels of government. The actual shape of the curves can be very different and does not have to 
be linear, but the point of this figure is to show, graphically, what has been found in empirical 
research. Studies have explicitly or implicitly identified a trend in the evolution of e-government 
initiatives (at the aggregate level) that seems to go from national to state, and to local 
governments (Stowers 1999; Moon 2002; Edmiston 2003; Holden et al. 2003). This is not 
exclusive to the United States; in other countries with highly developed electronic government 
initiatives at the national level such as New Zealand, many local governments are still in the very 
initial stages of e-government (Cullen, O'Connor and Veritt 2003). 
Generally, national governments have both financial resources and technical expertise to 
be able to move constantly toward continuously more sophisticated stages of e-government. 
Arguably, they also have the least direct democratic control from citizens, businesses, and other 
stakeholders. However, state and local governments are also improving their e-government 
initiatives. For instance Moon (2002) mentions that “following the federal initiative, many local 
governments also adopted IT for local governance.” (p. 424). As mentioned earlier, e-
government adoption and sophistication is increasing fast, but as of 2000, “most local 
governments had a presence on the Web and were at least at the beginning stages of e-
government development [but] few of them offered sophisticated on-line services involving 
interactive transactions.” (Holden et al. 2003, p. 341). 
 Time 
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Figure 1— E-Gov Evolution (From National to Local) 
 
As an example of this trend, in the United States of America there is a clear disparity 
between federal, state, and local governments (Moon 2002; Edmiston 2003; Holden et al. 2003). 
Many state and local governments are attempting to make the transition from the initial or 
extended presence stages to the transactional stage. Some other local governments are still 
cataloging information (Reddick 2004) or trying to establish their first web page for citizens and 
business use. In a different context, some European countries, Canada, and the United States are 
competing to have the most advanced e-government capabilities. It is important to clarify that 
this trend does not refer to the government portal or main page only, but to the complete 
government website including agency-specific and inter-agency websites. As a result of this 
second dynamic, “e-government at the local level is still in its formative stages” (Holden et al. 
2003). However, there are important exceptions to this trend such as G2B applications (Reddick 
2004) and e-government websites in some large cities (Ho 2002). These exceptions highlight 
how specific contexts and the capabilities and resources of certain stakeholders (e.g., business) 
can influence e-government evolution. 
The two e-government dynamics described in this section are not mutually exclusive and 
normally work in a complex interplay. The following hypothetical situation can help to 
understand some of the mechanisms of both evolutionary dynamics. In the Nation of Utopia, 
some national-level government agencies start including more transactions on their websites 
generating two different dynamics. First, other government agencies at the same national level, 
either from the same country or from other countries, decide to include more services and 
sophisticated features as a case of emergent institutional isomorphism (La Porte, Demchak and 
Friis 2001). The fact that more agencies are providing transactional services creates pressure on 
other governmental agencies to follow the same path (at the national level and the state and local 
levels). Second, once government agencies at different levels (e.g., federal, state, and local) are 
providing transactional services through their websites, citizens from other governments realize 
this can be useful and start demanding e-government transactional services to their own 
politicians and public managers (Curtin, Sommer and Vis-Sommer 2003). 
 
III. The Study of Rules 
Organizational action is established around rules which fit together to create and maintain the 
systems organizations use to grow and evolve (Vanberg 1994). Because “rules and resources 
mediate human action while at the same time they are reaffirmed through being used by human 
actors” (Orlikowski 1992, p. 404), studying both rule systems and the behavior of the actors in 
those systems is important. 
 Scholars in the social sciences have recognized that rules enable action in organizations 
and everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Ganz 1971; Hayes 1989). Possibly, there is no 
action—including e-government activity—that is not related to rules, either written or unwritten 
(Schauer 1991). However, despite the powerful role rule formation and its dynamics play, they 
have been studied only rarely (for examples see March, Schulz and Zhou 2000; and Martinez-
Moyano 2004). 
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Figure 2—Cycle of rule evolution (adapted from March et al. 2000) 
 
 As portrayed in Figure 2, rules influence action through a process of implementation. 
Over time, and through interpretation mechanisms, the results of actions are translated into a 
history that determines what an effective and useful practice in organizations is. Understanding 
the interpretation mechanisms is essential to comprehending the lessons that are formalized as 
history. In the interpretation process, there can be several biases and misidentification problems 
(for a review see Kleindorfer, Kunreuther and Shoemaker 1993). The way action becomes 
history is a social process in which knowledge is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 
1966) and, in some cases, has little or nothing to do with logic and evidence. 
Once a set of insights has been recorded as history, an adaptation process transforms the 
lessons of history into rules. The accumulation of rules creates a rule repertoire in the 
organization, closing the evolutionary cycle of rule formation and change. Organizational rule 
systems then become organizational repositories of lessons from history: organizational memory 
in action. The problem of using organizational memory in the future still exists though. The fact 
that organizations are capable, through learning, of accumulating knowledge about how to deal 
with the challenges of their environments does not ensure that this information will be used 
adequately, or at all. Rule-following preferences of individuals and norms for rule compliance in 
organizations, can act as enablers of the inherent power of the rule systems. A very powerful rule 
system that is not adequately used and followed will be inefficient, just as a fully followed, but 
weak, rule system. Compliance dynamics play a key role in understanding the observed 
capabilities of systems in organizations (Martinez-Moyano, McCaffrey and Oliva 2005). 
 A viable theory that includes the notions of rules and evolution requires, at the least, a 
definition of what a rule is that will enable the individuals to examine the existence, change, and 
reproduction of rules and systems of rules as general, ongoing, and historically embedded 
mechanisms in organizations. Referring to rules, Giddens (1984, p. 21, 377) proposes the notions 
of ‘structure’ and ‘rules.’ Sewell (1992, p. 8, 27) advances ideas of ‘structure’ and ‘schema,’ 
while Bourdieu (1977) suggests the notion of ‘structure’ and ‘habitus.’ Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
identify rules as ‘formal structure’ and ‘myth and ceremony,’ and Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 
96) link rules with their definition of ‘institutionalization’ and ‘institutions.’ Synthesizing notions 
from the literature, we define rules as ‘probabilistic generalizations of behavior’ and systems of 
rules as ‘the set of written organizational codes—herein called rules—and unwritten 
organizational norms—herein called norms—that conditions action in organizations.’ 
 IV. Goals in Systems of Rules 
Why do rule systems change over time? Part of the answer to this question seems to be related to 
the different concerns designers of systems of rules have about rule systems and their goals 
(Zhou 1993), because the goal of the rule system determines its structure over time. Goals in 
systems of rules can be conceptualized using two different approaches (Martinez-Moyano and 
Gil-Garcia 2004). Rules and rule systems can be designed primarily as behavior-constraining 
mechanisms (OReilly and Chatman 1996; Feldman 2000; Feldman 2002), or they can principally 
be thought of as solution-guiding mechanisms (Burt, Gabbay, Holt and Moran 1994; Roberts and 
Dowling 2002). This distinction is introduced as a way to organize and understand better the 
different concerns identified in the literature. We know that every time that a rule is issued, the 
rule maker can have both purposes in mind, constraining behavior and generating a solution to a 
problem. 
Identifying rules and systems of rules as solution-guiding artifacts focuses the attention 
on how well the system of rules ‘embodies’ the set of solutions to the problems and opportunities 
the organization faces at any given time. Presumably, changes in the systems of rules are guided 
by the adequacy of the current set of rules with respect to the current set of recognized problems 
and opportunities the organization faces (the main driver is related to performance 
enhancement). Alternatively, the behavior-constraining approach to systems of rules is more 
concerned with the adequacy of the systems of rules to generate a predetermined, or expected, 
behavioral response from both individuals and organizations (driver focused on accountability 
concerns). 
 
Systems of Rules as Behavior-Constraining Mechanisms 
Systems of rules in organizations can be conceptualized as means for control (Hayek 1945; 
Schauer 1991; Hauser 1995). Researchers have found empirical evidence of this. For example, 
O’Reilly and Chatman’s (1996) work looks at control systems based on shared norms and values 
that influence members’ focus of attention and interpretation of events, and guide their attitude 
and behavior. In addition, investigating organizational routines, Feldman (2000) identified great 
potential for change in the way organizations carry out supposedly invariant lines of action 
embodied in organizational routines. Feldman (2000; 2002) emphasizes the behavior-
constraining characteristics of the system of rules embodied in organizational routines by 
reporting that change in organizational routines comes from the internal dynamics of the 
routines, connections between citizens, understanding about what needs to be done, and from 
thoughts and behavioral reactions of individuals participating in the routines. She says, “people 
will tend to breathe life into the routines they engage in because of the relationship between their 
behavior and their plans and ideals” (Feldman 2000, p. 627). 
The introduction of a new rule as a behavior-constraining mechanism was found in a 
federally-funded training on the job program: the Job Training Partnership Act—JTAP—of 
1982. JTPA created one of the largest federal employment and training programs in the country 
(Courty and Marschke 2003). The JTPA replaced its precursor Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act—CETA—as the major job-training program for the poor (Cragg 1995). Its main 
innovation over the previous program in place—CETA—was the use of a performance-
contingent incentive system. JTPA had a budget of nearly $4.0 billion dollars and served a 
constituency of almost one million people annually. JTPA’s mission has been defined as to 
“raise the earnings ability and lower the welfare dependency of the poor.” (Courty and Marschke 
2003, p. 275) Alternatively, it has been identified as to increase the long-term human capital of 
program enrollees. JTPA’s mission, in other words, was to help the economically disadvantaged 
do better in the long run via improving their skills and capacity to become employed and be self-
sufficient, a very noble mission indeed . 
Congress intended JTPA activities to influence participants’ human capital by helping 
participants become more capable and efficient workers by means of training. In order to provide 
incentives for the service providers to align their efforts with the intended results, performance 
measurement changed over time. Performance measurement in JTPA changed from cost-based 
performance measurement, to termination-based performance measurement, to follow-up-
indicators-based performance measurement. Under these mechanisms, the service agency 
graduates enrollees as part of their normal process. An enrollee that has finalized the training, 
under ideal circumstances, would be graduated and reported to the state. However, that was not 
the case always. For example, in some cases, training agencies reported graduation dates 
differently than the actual dates in which the enrollees finished training causing interesting 
dynamics derived of these behaviors. 
The first significant rule change under JTPA was the introduction of ‘the 90-day’ rule. 
This rule was introduced as a behavior-constraining mechanism to force the providers of services 
to behave in a certain way. After CETA was replaced by JTPA in 1982, performance 
measurement of the providers of services was conducted in the exact same way as during CETA. 
Under the original rule, the providers of services were compensated according to a metric called 
‘employment rate at termination’ that measured the job success of the trainees at moment of 
termination from the training program. Under this regime, the higher the employment rate at 
termination (ERT), the better. Managers in training agencies were given latitude on when to 
terminate enrollees. Managers would terminate individuals only if they had jobs, not before. This 
created incredible high ERTs. This continued until the department of labor recognized that it had 
been determined “by monitors and auditors” that managers in training centers had allowed “some 
participants continued to be carried in an ‘active’ or ‘inactive’ status for two or three years after 
last contact” (US_Department_of_Labor 1993, p. 4) with their training programs. Their way to 
constrain the behavior of the providers was with the creation and implementation of a new rule: 
the 90-day rule. With the inclusion of the 90-day rule, the DOL required training agencies to 
measure performance using the ERT measure but also required agencies to terminate individuals 
that had not received any services after a maximum of 90 days. The new rule, the 90-day rule, 
was designed to provide agencies “some latitude in securing jobs for their customers” 
(US_Department_of_Labor 1997, p. 1) [and improving their performance measure], and at the 
same time avoiding the possibility of hiding bad performance by not terminating unsuccessful 
candidates.  
After the introduction of the 90-Day-Rule Regime, “another important change in the 
measurement system was to move to ‘follow-up’ measures.” (Courty and Marschke 2003, p. 
279). The introduction of the follow-up-rule regime became, in JTPA, the way to solve different 
problems identified over time in JTPA-related provision of training services. The follow-up-rule 
regime was the response of JTPA officials to the problems identified after the introduction of the 
90-day rule regime. The most important problem identified was the possibility of influencing the 
performance measure by means that were not aligned with the ‘true spirit’ of the program. JTPA 
officials identified, at least, three mechanisms that providers of services decided to use after the 
implementation of the 90-day rule regime to influence their performance outcomes: introduction 
of post-training actions, strategic termination of enrollees, and cream skimming (for details of 
the mechanisms see Martinez-Moyano 2004) 
 
Systems of Rules as Solution-Guiding Mechanisms 
The solution-guiding approach to systems of rules is mainly concerned with the way in which 
systems of rules represent a solution—or match—to the problems managers are able to identify 
and consider important. Additionally, it represents the concern to create organizational solutions 
for the simplification of the decisional process. According to the solution-guiding view, the more 
rules individuals in organizations can use, the simpler their decision process will be. Rules 
become solutions to problems. 
 Researchers such as Burt, Gabbay, Holt, and Moran (1994) have identified a clear link 
between the value of a system of rules in an organization and the type of market the organization 
is in. According to these researchers, a strong corporate set of guidelines is a valuable asset in 
competitive markets and can be almost worthless in non-competitive environments. Additionally, 
Roberts and Dowling (2002), who have investigated the link between corporate reputation and 
sustained superior financial performance, report that “good reputation is difficult, if not 
impossible, to replicate in the short term” (p. 1079). This is because it is linked to tangible assets 
such as previous financial results and to intangible assets such as the organizational way of doing 
what they do—procedures, rules, and routines. Roberts and Dowling (2002) explicitly compare 
their findings with those of Sorensen’s study (2002) that investigated the relationship between 
the strength of corporate culture and organizational performance. 
 Roberts and Dowlings’ (2002) study and Sorensen’s (2002) study stress the capacity of 
systems of rules to be solution-guiding mechanisms over time; part of their findings is that this 
capacity declines as time goes on, implying that the rate of change of the system of rules does 
not match the rate of change of the environment. 
 Other researchers, such as Ensminger and Knight (1997), stress the idea of sets of rules as 
solution-guiding mechanisms in their investigation of norms. They say, “in some cases they 
[members of the society] will create norms consciously; in other cases the norms will emerge as 
unintended consequences of the pursuit of strategic advantage. In each case the focus is on the 
substantive outcome; the development of the norm is merely a means to that end” (Ensminger 
and Knight 1997, p.5). The rules are there to provide strategic advantage and to improve the 
chances of generating appropriate outcomes. 
 Researchers in evolutionary economics have recognized the significance of 
organizational rules, particularly in relation to changes in technological production (Massini, 
Lewin, Numagami and Pettigrew 2002). Massini, Lewin, Numagami, and Pettigrew (2002) 
investigated the evolution of organizational routines from an evolutionary perspective, exploring 
adoption and adaptation of new structural and procedural organizational routines and emerging 
dominant managerial practices in large European, Japanese, and US firms between 1992 and 
1996. They reported that, “procedures relate to the rules and routines underlying the firm’s 
execution of activities’’ (Massini et al. 2002, p. 1334), and that they relate to changes firms make 
in competitive environments that influence the level of organizations’ performance. 
 One of the findings of the study by Massini, Lewin, Numagami, and Pettigrew (2002, p. 
1335) is that “from an evolutionary perspective, organizational differences are grounded in the 
ability to generate and internalize innovations, rather than in the possession of certain 
technologies” speaking to the power of systems of rules as solution-guiding mechanisms in 
organizations. The greater an organization’s ability to internalize changes in their systems of 
rules, the greater the probability it will exhibit ‘successful’ results over time. 
For example, a new rule as a solution-guiding mechanism arose when in 2003, in an epic-
making action, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced enforcement actions against 
ten Wall Street firms and two individual analysts arising from an investigation of research 
analyst conflict of interest (SEC 2003; SEC 2004) totaling $1.4 billion. The settlements were 
reached with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the New York Attorney 
General (NYAG), and other state regulators.  The firms accepted that they had encouraged their 
investment analysts to publicly exaggerate corporations’ investment value, misleading investors, 
in order to win the corporations’ investment banking business. Martinez-Moyano, McCaffrey, 
and Oliva (2005, p. 10) report email exchanges between analysts and institutional investors about 
excessively favorable rating for firms conveying the situation. 
 
An institutional investor and an analyst discussed the effect of the conflict of 
interest on the analyst’s research in the following exchange: 
Institutional Investor: I understand – business is business. But I feel bad for those 
naïve investors who assume that sell-side analysts are objective!  I wish some 
buy-side institutions would get together to establish an independent equity 
research consortium with analysts paid for on a subscription basis or something… 
Analyst: well, ratings and price targets are fairly meaningless anyway, buy-side 
[large investors] generally ignores, commentary is what matters and I’ll be a 
[more negative about the company]…in my comments . . . but, yes, the “little 
guy” who isn’t smart about the nuances may get misled, such is the nature of my 
business (NYSE 2003, p. 15). 
 
 The net result of the settlements included the introduction of the new rule in which 
investment baking and research were to be managed as two independent entities within in the 
firms. This rule presented a solution to the problem identified. Solutions like this may or may not 
include explicit constraints to individual or organizational behavior. 
 
Systems of Rules as Bidimensional Mechanisms 
Designers of systems of rules in organizations might have a set of preferences and skills that will 
allow them to design systems of rules that will have a combination of the two goals just 
discussed (see Figure 3). The combinations create four quadrants of possible types of rules and 
of systems of rules, according to the main goal of the system’s designer. 
 High
Solution Guiding
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Solution Guiding
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Behavior Constraining
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IIIII
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Figure 3—Goals in systems of rules 
 
Quadrant I—high on the solution concern and high on the behavior concern—represents 
systems of rules created to solve the problems the organization faces via constraining individual 
behavior. This would be the case in which the problem that the organization experiences is 
derived mainly from the behavior of certain individuals. For example, in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks on the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration determined that the solution (at 
lest partially) to the problem of having weapons inside air carriers was to constrain the range of 
behaviors that the passengers could adopt. Specifically, what types of things could be carried on 
board. The FAA changed the rules of carry-on items and those related to personal searches 
limiting the behavior of passengers and ‘solving’ the problem. 
Alternatively, quadrant II—high on the behavior control concern and low on the solution 
concern—represents systems of rules designed primarily to constrain behavior, even when that is 
not necessarily aligned with the solutions needed to the current problems the organization is 
facing. In this case, the designer of the system of rules is more concerned with the internal 
dynamics than the external ones. This approach—a housekeeping approach—is widely used due 
to the illusion of being in control of the organizations’ destiny. It is always easier to try to control 
the internal environment than the external. For example, a typical response to growing levels of 
absenteeism or accidents in organizations is to increase the reporting required to document this 
phenomenon.  The more accidents or people absent, the more reports produced. This response 
creates an illusion of being in control by constraining the range of behaviors (with respect to 
reporting) that individuals can engage in. However, it has very little effect (if any) on solving the 
associated problem. 
Quadrant III—low on both dimensions—represent rules that have no real impact on the 
organization, these could be considered some sort of irrelevant rules. For example, in the case of 
Federal initiatives for training on the job, critical variables to measure performance of service 
providers changed when the original program (Job Training Partnership Act –JTPA) changed to 
become the Workforce Investment Act (WIA)3.  Under JTPA, the variables used were the 
Employment Rate at Termination (ERT), the Welfare Employment Rate at Termination 
(WERT), the Average Wage at Termination (AWT), the Cost per Employment (CE), the 
Employment Rate at Follow-up (ERF), the Welfare Employment Rate at Follow-up (WERF), the 
Average Weekly Earnings at Follow-up (AWEF), and the Average Weeks Worked by 
Follow-up (AWWF).  Under WIA, the measures changed to the Entered Employment Rate 
(EER), the Employment Retention Rate (ERR), the Earnings Change in Six Months (ECSM), 
and the Employment and Credential Rate (ECR). However, independently of the number of 
measures used, the main driver of performance assessment remained the same, the employment 
rate of the graduates of the training programs (ERT & EER). In this case, changing the definition 
                                                 
3 See Appendix 1 for a description of the measures used in the programs. 
of the measures used was of little consequence in terms of behavior of the providers of services 
and in terms of solving the problems of the program. 
Lastly, quadrant IV—high on the solution guiding and low on the behavior 
constraining—represent rules that are truly seeking to resolve the challenges that the 
organization is facing assuming that the individuals in it are capable and will follow the rules. 
For example, in the case of the financial markets regulation, prominent failures and scandals 
overrode reservations about the effect of new legislation on the markets and produced major 
securities laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July of 2002 (Seligman 2003). Part of the 
changes introduced in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) contemplates the introduction of new rules 
that promotes enhanced financial disclosures (Title IV) and auditor independence (Title II). 
These change were designed to provide a clear solution to lack of communication prevalent in 
the market and to the normalization of deviance problem (Vaughan 1996; Vaughan 1998; 
Vaughan 1999) generated over time.  
In general, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) introduced changes that could be identified in 
the solution-guiding area and in the behavior-constraining area. This is true of most systems of 
rules due to the multiplicity of rules contained in them. However, at the level of specific rules, it 
is possible to distinguish better the specific type of rules using the distinctions presented in this 
section. 
 An assumption of this model is that the designer of the system of rules is a single actor 
who can unilaterally decide the components of the system of rules and its overall orientation—
solutions vs. behavior constraining. This assumption may be valid only for private-sector 
organizations, especially small ones. In private sector organizations the decision making process 
tends to be more centralized than in public sector organizations. Additionally, in the private 
sector in general, the operations are not carried out in a participatory manner. However, in the 
public sector, and for large organizations, the single-designer assumption might be difficult to 
sustain due to the complexity of the decision-making processes, and the necessary degree of 
participation due to the existence of multiple stakeholders with multiple and often conflicting 
views and goals. Additionally, in the public sector exist institutionalized checks and balances 
systems (Wilson 1887; Waldo 1980; Rosenbloom 1983; Riccucci 2001) that make it difficult for 
a single individual or organization to decide and define changes to the systems of rules. This 
situation makes the single-designer assumption hard to sustain in governmental contexts. 
 V. Multiple Designers and Systems of Rules in the Public Sector 
The single-designer assumption in the construction of solutions must be relaxed to incorporate 
the characteristics public managers have to consider in e-government initiatives. E-government 
initiatives can be characterized in general as solutions to problems identified by public managers. 
The problems identified might vary from unclear, ill-defined issues that will be solved by e-
government action, to very clearly defined requirements requested of the government by citizens, 
politicians, interest groups, among others (the principals). Problems can also range from 
relatively clear technical problems to complex political, economic, or social considerations. 
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Figure 4—Citizens’ view (including other stakeholders) 
 
 Frequently, a solution via e-government is often devised first by public managers and 
then, if certain conditions are met, it becomes a requirement that must be fulfilled in order to be 
evaluated as ‘doing the right thing.’ In the public sector, particularly in the case of e-government 
initiatives, at least two parties will be involved in the system design: public managers as 
suppliers, and citizens, businesses, and other stakeholders as demanders. This characteristic 
transforms the goal-definition problem in the design of systems of rules from a single-designer 
problem to a multi-designer problem. In general, citizens are able to ‘see’ the problem across 
only one dimension: the behavior-constraint dimension. Citizens and other stakeholders are 
concerned with how public managers are doing their jobs and how they comply with the 
requirements set for them (accountability). Citizens expect that public managers have the ability 
and technical expertise to provide high-level solutions to the problems identified. Therefore, as 
presented in Figure 4, the most important dimension for citizens and other stakeholders is the 
control dimension. 
 In the case of public managers, e-government initiatives concentrate mainly on the 
solution-guiding dimension (see Figure 5). The ideal operating scenario for public managers is to 
be able to concentrate exclusively on how good their initiatives are with respect to the problems 
they are facing (performance). Public managers seek having enough discretion to be able to 
design and implement the solution that best addresses the problem at hand (flexibility). This case 
implies a low behavior-constraint emphasis on the part of the citizens and other stakeholders. 
Moon and Welch (2004) explain that “the bureaucrat’s enthusiasm for swifter implementation of 
e-government appears to be fueled by strong confidence in the capacity of government to 
securely provide services and respond to citizen needs.” (p. 8) 
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Figure 5—Public managers’ View 
 
 The ideal scenario would be the one in which public managers are capable of doing 
exactly what they think they should be doing with respect to one specific problem (high solution-
guiding concern), while the citizens they serve evaluate that precise activity as a requirement that 
the public managers should be fulfilling (high behavior-constraining concern). The likelihood of 
this being the case is very low. However, this idealized exploration enables us to identify the 
power of a shared vision—in the sense that Senge (1990) describes—on what the e-government 
activities should be. If there is an alignment (natural or created) between what the public 
managers want to do and what the citizens and other stakeholders consider is required, the two 
constituencies would be operating at the height of their own relevant dimensions with respect to 
the design of the system of government activities—e-government in particular. 
 
VI. E-Government Evolution: Reframing the Politics and Administration Dilemma 
If the view that government is closer to citizens at the local level is true, then the degree of 
responsiveness and accountability will be greater in local governments. The capacity of citizens 
and other stakeholders to control public managers increases from the national, to the state, to the 
local level (see Figure 6). For instance, scholars interested in topics such as devolution or 
decentralization have identified that state and local governments are more sensitive to citizen’s 
needs and potentially also more accountable to them (Gore 1996; Nathan 1996; Thompson and 
Riccucci 1998). Thus, the system of rules that governs the development of e-government 
initiatives moves from a self-imposed, solution-oriented goal (at national level), to a behavior-
control-oriented goal (at local level). 
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Figure 6—Evolution of e-government initiatives 
 
 This argument suggests that e-government initiatives may evolve from national to local 
levels of government, and that decision-making power would simultaneously shift from public 
managers to citizens and other stakeholders. As the reader can observe, this dimension between 
problem-solution-oriented and behavior-control-oriented goals can be equated to the well-
established politics and administration dilemma (Wilson 1887). Initially e-government initiatives 
are greatly shaped by public managers’ concerns (mainly at national level). After some time, 
citizens and other stakeholders (directly or through their representatives) gain more control over 
what e-government is, or should be; in other words, what level of technological sophistication is 
considered adequate, and what services they want. However, it is important to clarify that 
citizens’ expectations, or e-government demand, may or may not have a direct effect on e-
government functionality but a more complex indirect influence (La Porte et al. 2001; Ho 2002; 
Gil-García 2005). 
The dynamics described above might not always generate ideal results. Using a 
democratic lens, and assuming that citizens and other stakeholders have complete information 
about the details of e-government initiatives and their actual results, the change in control seems 
very positive. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes citizens demand a greater level of 
services and technological sophistication only because that is what they observe in other 
contexts, not because they actually need it. Therefore, this approach enables an understanding of 
the positive and negative impacts of e-government initiatives, even if citizens and other 
stakeholders (as principals of public managers) have certain level of control. In fact, due to an 
information asymmetry problem, public managers will have discretionary spaces to re-interpret 
and modify some of the demands of citizens, businesses, politicians, and other stakeholders. 
 
VII. Final Comments 
This paper explored the interaction between the way e-government evolves over time and the 
way in which the systems of rules that influence e-government action change. We used 
institutional theory and the study of rules to reframe the well-established politics and 
administration dilemma in our model. Additionally, we have characterized the design problem in 
systems of rules as mainly a single-designer situation in the private sector and as a multi-
designer situation in the public sector. In the latter case, actors involved have different interests 
along different dimensions that make coordination more difficult than in the first case. It seems 
that, in the case of public-sector action, in general, and in e-government activity, in particular, 
the development of a shared vision between public managers and their constituencies of the 
initiatives to be accomplished could be key for a successful outcome across dimensions and 
expectations. Part of what is needed to create a useful shared vision is the development of clear 
dynamic indicators for the evaluation of e-government initiatives. Researchers argue that today, 
metrics used to asses e-government initiatives are “designed to measure the static nature of e-
government performance mainly based on web content analysis” (Moon, Welch and Wong 2005, 
p. 10) not capturing adequately the dynamic nature of their actions and interactions.  
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Figure 7—Extent of use of e-government initiatives 
 We argue that, in the case of e-government initiatives, public managers are in charge for 
a period of time in which they develop and test initiatives to assess their efficiency and 
effectiveness. However, after the extent—the combination of frequency and importance—of use 
of those initiatives reach a critical point (point y in Figure 7)—herein called tipping point (for an 
extended treatment of the subject see Sterman 2000)—the control of the initiative changes to the 
citizens and other stakeholders by declaring the existence of the initiative as a requirement for 
‘normal’ operation. 
This insight has potential implications in the way in which new initiatives are to be 
designed and tested (by bureaucrats) in order to maintain their control and be able to contain its 
use and growth.  Furthermore, it has been argued that setting the pace for implementation of e-
government in a democratic environment “requires the understanding of the different mental 
models according to which citizens, bureaucrats and politicians operate.” (Moon and Welch 
2004, p. 9) According to this rationale, public managers might be better off when, and if, they 
identify where the tipping point is to determine if they want the e-government initiative to 
behave like the ‘A’ curve in Figure 7, or in a more constrained fashion like curve ‘B’, or if 
needed, terminate the initiative (curve ‘C’). In order to find the said tipping point, public 
managers can rely on longitudinal studies of relevant characteristics of e-government action—
like sources of funding and requirements—and, additionally, in the use of dynamic modeling 
techniques (Richardson and Pugh 1981; Sterman 2000). In general, public managers might be 
able to maintain control of the e-government initiative from point ‘0’ in the extent of use scale to 
point ‘x’; beyond that point, citizens and other stakeholders will control the initiative via 
establishing requirements—explicit or implicit—of e-government operation and using those 
systems. Simultaneously,  “as with all other types of significant managerial activities by public 
organizations, [e-government] success will be determined by the ability of public servants to 
understand and address the desires and concerns of the governing citizens and to communicate 
informed decisions to the same individuals as governed citizens.” (Moon and Welch 2004, p. 9) 
One example should serve to clarify how this can work for specific e-government 
initiatives. First, a new application for online driver’s license renewal is developed. For some 
time, citizens and other stakeholders start using the application at a very low pace (beginning of 
the curve). During that initial period and until certain extent of use (represented by x), public 
managers can evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the new application and make decisions about 
modifications or even terminating the program (which would lead to a curve like C in figure 6). 
Once many stakeholders are using the application, or relatively few stakeholders are using the 
application very intensively (extent of use), which is represented as the curve after point y, 
terminating the program would be a very difficult option. By then, citizens, businesses, and other 
stakeholders will be knowledgeable about the benefits of the online driver’s license renewal 
application and they will expect to continue being able to use it. Therefore, even if the 
application is not cost-effective or have other major problems, it would be very difficult for 
public mangers to abandon the initiative. At that point, only curves A and B are potential 
alternatives. For example, if they want to increase the use of the online application in a major 
way, they can use an aggressive marketing campaign to communicate effectively with the 
citizens as Moon and Welch (2004) suggest to do to ensure success in e-government 
implementation processes. If this campaign and other actions are successful, then the initiative 
may look like curve A.  The evolution of a good online application without other managerial 
support (e.g., marketing) may look like curve B. Public managers should be aware of all this 
complexity and develop strategies according to their different options (including terminating the 
initiative) and the goals of the e-government applications. 
 According to the theory presented in this paper, e-government is evolving toward more 
sophisticated and complex standards due to several mechanisms. Simultaneously, public 
managers looking for solutions to their interests, and citizens and other stakeholders looking for 
better services and accountability mechanisms will produce continuous pressures for the 
evolution of e-government definition and requirements. Thus, this paper provides a useful 
theoretical model to understand the evolution of e-government and to identify some of the 
feedback mechanisms that create that evolutionary pattern. One question that remains is how to 
create e-government policies and standards that can be both solutions to what public managers 
consider problems and, at the same time, be responsive to citizens’ actual needs. This paper 
proposes the desirability of a system of rules and standards for e-government initiatives that can 
accomplish both goals: solution guidance and behavior control. A truly useful e-government 
model should foster the alignment between these two dimensions that can be translated into 
effective and responsive e-government action. 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Table 1— Federal JTPA Performance Measures in Effect in Years 1987-1989 (Courty and Marschke 2004) 
Performance Measure  Definition 
Adult Performance Measures 
Employment Rate at Termination ERT Fraction of terminees employed at termination 
Welfare Employment Rate at Termination WERT Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at termination 
Average Wage at Termination AWT Average wage at termination for terminees who were employed at termination 
Cost per Employment CE Training center’s year’s expenditures on adults divided by the number of adults employed at 
termination 
Employment Rate at Follow-up ERF Fraction of terminees who were employed at 13 weeks after termination 
Welfare Employment Rate at Follow-up WERF Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 13 weeks after 
termination 
Average Weekly Earnings at Follow-up AWEF Average weekly wage of terminees who were employed 13 weeks after termination 
Average Weeks Worked by Follow-up AWWF Average number of weeks worked by terminees in 13 weeks following termination 
Youth Performance Measures 
Youth Employment Rate at Termination YERT Fraction of youth terminees employed at termination 
Youth Employability Enhancement Rate YEEN Fraction of youth terminees who obtained employment competencies (see note 3 below) 
Youth Positive Termination Rate YPTR Fraction of youth terminees who were “positively terminated” (see note 3 below) 
Youth Cost per Employment YCE Training center’s year’s expenditures on youths divided by the number of youths positively 
terminated 
Notes: 
1. The data of termination is the date the enrollee officially exits training.  A terminee is an enrollee after he has officially exited training. 
2. All measures are calculated over the year’s terminee population.  Therefore, the average follow-up weekly earnings for 1987 was calculated using earnings at follow-up for the 
terminees who terminated in 1987, even if their follow-up period extended into 1988.  Likewise, persons who terminated in 1986 were not included in the 1987 measure, even if 
their follow-up period extended into 1987. 
3. A positive termination is entering un-subsidized employment, attaining youth employment “competencies” (through course-work, training and/or tests in work maturity, basic 
education, or job-specific skills), entering non-JTPA training, returning to school full-time, or completing a major level of education. 
Table 2— Federal WIA Core Performance Measures in Effect in Years 2000-2004 (US_Department_of_Labor 2004) 
Performance Measure  Definition 
Adult Performance Measures 
Entered Employment Rate EER # of adults who have entered employment by the end of the 1st quarter (Qtr.) after exit / # of adults 
who exit during the quarter 
Employment Retention Rate ERR # of adults who are employed in 3rd Qtr. after exit / # of adults who exit during the quarter 
Earnings Change in Six Months ECSM [Total Post-Program Earnings (earnings in Qtr 2 + Qtr 3 after exit)] - [Pre-Program Earnings 
(earnings in Qtrs 2 + 3 prior to registration)] / # of adults who exit during the quarter 
Employment and Credential Rate ECR # of adults who were employed in the 1st Qtr. after exit and received a credential by the end of 3rd 
quarter after exit / # of adults who exited services during the quarter 
Customer Satisfaction Measures 
Participant Customer Satisfaction PCS The weighted average of participant ratings on each of 3 questions regarding overall satisfaction 
with services received. This score is reported on a 0-100 scale 
Employer Customer Satisfaction ECS The weighted average of employer ratings on each of 3 questions regarding overall satisfaction with 
services received. This score is reported on a 0-100 scale. 
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